Edited and
translated by Axel Michaels
in collaboration with
Manik Bajracharya, Pabitra Bajracharya and Rajan
Khatiwoda
Created: 2021-04-13;
Last modified: 2024-06-12
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[1r]
111१८४६सालदेषि१८४९सालतक्भोट्मु[2r]
1⟪१⟫1सम्वत्१८५०सालमिति∙वैसाषसुदि१०रोज∙कादिन्∙कपतान्∙किरिकपात∙[2v]
1⟪२⟫1छैन्जाहावाट∙पनिषोटोमहिन्द्रमलिकोटक्मारि∙पठाइदिनुभनिगोर्षाकोमाहाराज∙[3r]
1⟪३⟫1र्चाकोर∙साँष्याकोलामाजीहरुकानाउमा∙चिठिलेषिआफ्नामानिस्∙स्मेत्गोर्षा[?]हारा[3v]
1⟪४⟫1⟪२⟫1कातरफवाटकसुरभयाकोहोअैल्हे∙गोर्षामहाराजसंग∙सलूककोकुराकाहानी∙[4r]
1⟪५⟫1काहानिहुदालामाहरुलेल्हासाको17 कसूर∙होभनितजविजगर्या∙ल्हासाव़ाला[?]सव़ा[4v]
1[...]1माआईपुग्या∙तिसानाअम्वाकासाथगोर्षामाहाराजकातर्फवाटवादसा[5r]
1⟪७⟫1येस्लामालाइकुनैजुक्तिलेपनिसिवानामालगिसिवानावाटपक्रिल्हासालैजाउ27 [?][5v]
1[...]1सुवेदारहरुलेसोहिजगामापुगीधुरिनकाजिगैह्रल्हासाकाभारादारहरु[6r]
1⟪९⟫1विचमाअघिजस्तैलडाईगर्दैउस्तरफ्कोफौजलाई∙हटाउदैआऊंदथ्यागोर्षा[6v]
1⟪१०⟫1पत्रमौजुदछमेरोकसूर∙होकिल्हासावालाकोकसूरहोवेसगरीविचारगर्न43[7r]
1⟪११⟫1लडाई∙कोषजानावारुदहोगोर्षामाहाराजकोसवैवारुदर∙सिपाहिस्मेत्जल्दा[7v]
1⟪१२⟫1चिनवादसाहवाटपठायाको∙ठुलासर्दार∙हरूल्हासामाआयाका53 छन्[8r]
1⟪१३⟫1राजकातरफ्वाटटुंठ्वाङ्58 उजीर∙लाई59 ∙चिठिलेषिपठाया∙फेरिउस्कोजवाफ[8v]
1⟪१४⟫1दियेन∙तरचिनकोफौजले∙किल्लाकाभित्र∙वारुद∙षानामारातकावि[9r]
1⟪१५⟫1चिनकोफौजयेकासि∙गोर्षामाहाराजकोफौजकोअगाडिआईपुग्दागोर्षामा[?][9v]
1⟪१६⟫1टाई∙पठायार∙तिनीहरुसवै∙धैवुंभंन्याजगामापुग्या∙व़ाहापछिचिनकोफौजका[10r]
1⟪१७⟫1सवषत्∙माकाजिरंजित्∙पाडे∙भोटुपाडे∙नरसिंटक्सारिलाई∙लडाई∙मापक्रिल्या[?][10v]
1⟪१८⟫1रवानागरि∙वजिरकोचिठिकोजवावमापनिदोस्तिगर्नाकोमन्जुरछभन्याधै[11r]
1⟪१९⟫1राजकोफौजउचाजगामाथियो∙चिनकोफौजतलतीरथियोयस्कार∙नले[?][11v]
1⟪२०⟫1⟪१०⟫1पषानालगिआफैलेतोपसोझ्याई∙गोर्षामाहाराजकाफौजतरफ्∙गोलिचलाउ[12r]
1⟪२१⟫1षिल्लत्वक्साई∙पठाई∙दिउलाभंन्या∙इ∙सवैकुरा∙उनैपाँडेटक्सारि∙हरुछेउभनि[?][12v]
1⟪२२⟫1⟪[...]१⟫1गर्नामाआफुवढियाबुझ्दछौभन्यापनिचाडैयस्कोजवावपठाईदिनुमपनि[13r]
1⟪२३⟫1जरनिमित्तअनौठा∙तोहफार∙अर्जिस्मेत्∙काजिदेव़दत्तथापा∙सुवाप्रतिमन्राना[13v]
1[...]1मागयाव़ाहाव़जिरले∙गोर्षामाहाराजलाई∙चिठिलेषिअनौठातोहफास्मे[14r]
1⟪२५⟫1घिल्लोठानादार∙अम्वा∙माथिरिसाई∙गोर्षामहाराजकोफौजडि⟪ग⟫र्चामाआउ[1r]
[This is] a book, [written in] Dhaibung99 , detailing the war with the kingdom of Tibet and with China’s Minister (ujira) [that took place] from the year [Vikrama Samvat] 1846 until the year 1849100 – 1
[2r]
As written below, [this is] a copy of a special report sent to councillors sahibs of Kalkattā (i.e., Kolkata) through the hands of Captain Kirkpatrick sahib and Bahādura Saukāta Jaṅga [written] on [Monday], the tenth day of the bright half of Vaiśākha in the [Vikrama] year 1850.
[This is] a side note recording the previous war with the country of Tibet under the dominion of China and the Minister of China (i.e., Fu-kang-an)101 that happened between the [Vikrama era] years 1846 until 1849; [it also records the outcome of] the treaty between the Chinese Emperor and the [Gorkhā] Mahārāja Raṇa Bahādura Sāha Bahādura Samśera Jaṅga.
[The currency problem (1788)]
In the past, there was a mutual friendship between the King of Nepāla and the King of Tibet (i.e., the Dalai Lama), and the unalloyed mahindramallī coin from Nepal was used as currency in Tibet102 . However, during the reign of King Jayaprakāsa Malla of Nepāla (i.e., Kathmandu) and King Rañjīta Malla of Bhadgaon, [the silver] mahindramallī was mixed with copper, and this debased mahindramallī was used in Tibet for some time. When Nepāla was brought under the control of the Gorkhā Mahārāja (i.e., Pṛthvīnārāyaṇa Śāha), the debased mahindramallī coin was made defunct.
After the frequent exchange of letters and establishing friendship with Tibet, the Gorkhā Maharāja sent his own people to [Tibet], stating: “Because the unalloyed mahindramallī coins of Nepāla and also the unalloyed mahindramallī coins of the Gorkhā Mahārāja were current in Tibet, now unalloyed mahindramallī coins of the Gorkhā Mahārāja are again minted. As it was not acceptable to use [simultaneously] the adulterated [coin], I will send [my] pure mahindramallī coins as currency, and they must be used in the Tibetan territory.” However, the people in Tibet sent [a message] to the Gorkhā Mahārāja, saying: “There are still a lot of adulterated mahindramallī coins in the territory of Tibet. To eliminate them will cause [us] significant damage. [Therefore] we do not agree to use [only] the unalloyed mahindramallī as [our] currency. Please mint adulterated mahindramallīs wherever you can and send them to us.”
[2v]
In this way, nine to ten years passed [with the exchange] of questions and answers. As stubbornness on both sides persisted, the Gorkhā Mahārāja103 , through his ambassador, sent a new directive savāla to the people of Tibet, saying: “If you insist that you cannot eliminate the adulterated mahindramallī, then it is appropriate to use the pure coins as pure ones, and the adulterated coins as adulterated ones. You should continue as it was done before, just as the traders used to take articles and goods to Tibet after purchasing them from Nepāla, and [likewise] used to bring them from Tibet to Nepāla.” [However] the people of Tibet did not respond and used the pure mahindramallī alongside the debased one104 . Furthermore, for three to four years, the merchants were unable to travel due to the closure of the road, rendering the Gorkhā Mahārāja's mint useless.
In light of these circumstances, the Gorkhā Mahārāja, recognising the Tibetans as his own friends, rightly proposed: “Send respected persons from your own side to the border to resolve this matter. From the side of the Gorkhā Mahārāja, [representatives] will then also come. If these arrangements are done, they will be beneficial for both sides. However, there might be evil traders on both sides.” But the Tibetans disagreed and therefore did not send respected persons to the border for the arrangement. [Instead] they said to the Gorkhā Mahārāja: “We have built a road through the plains of Tingri105 (text: Tigri), are establishing forts along the border, and have assembled 125,000 soldiers. If you want war, then come.”
When the people of Tibet sent a clear answer rejecting the [proposed] arrangements and became ready for war, the Gorkhā Mahārāja understood that Tibet is a territory of the Chinese Emperor. Realising that war was not appropriate, he wrote a petition arjī to the Chinese Emperor explaining that the people of Tibet had rejected offers of negotiations and prepared for war. He [also] wrote a letter to (lit. ‘in the name of’) the amban (text: ambā) and police officer at Lhasa, and the honourable Lāmās of Ḍigarcā i.e.,[in Shigatse]106 and Sākya107 [monastery] and dispatched his people to Lhasa.
[3r]
When the petition and letters reached Lhasa, the petition was not forwarded to the Chinese Emperor, but was sent back to the Nepalese side. At that time, the Gorkhā Mahārāja sent a response to the Tibetans, saying: “I have no intention of making war. However, if you are not satisfied with this [arrangement] and intend to make war, then it is also acceptable for me, and I will send my army.”
[The first Tibet-Gorkha war begins – negotiations with Tibet and China]
[The Gorkhali] then sent their army108 to Tibet and fought a war that reached up to Sikārajaṅg109 , but due to difficult terrain the army was forced to stay there for a month [only], encircling Sikārajaṅg. During that month, the Tibetan cavalry and infantry, along with military equipment such as cannons, came to help the Sikārajaṅg people three to four times, but by the grace of God, the Gorkhā Mahārāja’s army defeated them.
Afterwards, the respected Tashi Lāmā (text: Ṭesu Lāmā)110 and honourable Lāmās from Ḍigarcā and Sākya [Monastery] went to the army of the Gorkhā Mahārāja and said: “We can arrange a mutual peace arrangement. Stop the war!” When the Gorkhā Mahārāja’s army chief spoke to the honorable Tashi Lāmā, he said: “We previously attempted to make peace with [you] Tibetans but since you did not agree to it, we have come this far [with our army]. If you want to negotiate peace, you should send the kājī of Lhasa (i.e., Doring Tenzin Peljor, see below) and [other] respected men to Kerung111 (text:Keruṃ) and Kuti112 . Respected men from both sides can sit together and arrange a treaty.” The lāmās agreed to this proposal, and therefore the army of the Gorkhā Mahārāja withdrew from Sikārajaṅg and stationed at Kerung and Kuti, Jhuṅgā113 and Phalāvāṅ114 .
When the Chinese Emperor heard all these details, [his] army chief sardāraCān Cun115 with two to four ambans and many soldiers116 [were sent to and] arrived in Lhasa.
[3v]
Then the respected Dalai Lama (text: Potalā Lāmā) from Lhasa and the respected lāmās from Ḍigarcā and Sākya [Monastery] told the army chief Cān Cun: “We made a mistake, [but] now we are having negotiations with the Gorkhā Mahārāja for a proper arrangement. We will send our own respected men to Kerung to arrange it. Until [this] arrangement is concluded, please remain here (in Lhasa).” Cān Cūn replied: “Arrange it quickly!”
Then several reputable men, [including] Tashi Lāmā’s father, three other lāmās from Sākya [Monastery], the reputable big kājī from Lhasa [named] Dhurin117 , the treasurer Devuka118 , nine to ten students/monks of the Potāla (text:Putālā) Lāmā, arrived in Kerung. The Gorkhā Mahārāja sent Sāmarpā Lāmā119 , Kaptān (Captain) Bam Bahādura Śāha (text: Bam Sāha), Mint-master (ṭaksari)Harihara Upādhyā, Narasiṃ Sāhi and other four to five respected men to Kerung [to prepare the so-called 1789 treaty of Kerung].120 By this time, the army chief Cān Cun had also arrived at Sikārajang.
When the respected representatives from both sides met for negotiations, the vakila of the Gorkhā Mahārāja stated: “When the previous arrangement was made, the Tibetans acted differently and talked arrogantly, and the army of the Gorkhā Mahārāja reached up to here. Because the Tibetan roads were closed for eight to ten years, the mint [of the mahendramalli] and custom duties were also closed, and because of this stopping, in both affairs, hundreds of thousands of rupees in expenses and losses happened to the Gorkhā Mahārāja. Make an arrangement for compensating the rupees!”
In these negotiations, the Tibetans agreed, saying: “In these quarrels between both sides, you had a lot of expenses of rupees but we cannot compensate for it.” Then the vakila of Gorkhā replied to the lāmās of Sākya and Ḍigarcā as well as to Sāmarpā Lāmā: “Please, you three lāmās, be mediators and make an arrangement. If it is our fault, we will compensate whatever loss of rupees and expenses is due to Lhasa. If it is Lhasa’s fault, you should compensate our loss.”
[4r]
While these negotiations were taking place, the lāmās judged that it was Lhasa’s fault. After the delegation from Lhasa acknowledged this during the discussions, they said: “We cannot compensate for this much in rupees, but if you would consider reducing the amount, we will certainly compensate121 .” Then the vakila of Gorkhā Mahārāja replied: “If you cannot compensate for all our expenses and losses, then give us 5,000,000 rupees and we will restore the old border. If you cannot (provide this amount), you should leave to us the new territories south of Langur122 which are under our occupancy. If you cannot do even this, give us every year 100,000 rupees.” The delegation from Lhasa did not agree to any of these proposals.
[A kind of truce and the first mission to Beijing]
[Afterwards] the army chief Cān Cun sent the two ambans, Mutājin and Ṭāṅga Tājīn123 , together with soldiers to Kerung. When both ambans reached Kerung, they enquired about the arguments of both sides, looked into the matter, had many discussions, and concluded on the second day that it was the fault of the Lhasa people. They criticised them [for this], and [in the end], the Lhasa people agreed to pay 50,000 rupees annually to the Gorkhā Mahārāja124 . The ambans caused both sides to place the deities as witnesses and to issue a religiously solemnized agreement dharmapatra. After the agreement was issued, these two ambans, representing the army chief Cān Cun, caused the two sides to come to peaceful terms and returned to Lhasa. Later, people from the kājī of Lhasa and the lāmās of Ḍigarcā and Sākya deposited 50,000 rupees of the first year in the treasury of the Gorkhā Mahāraja, as written in the agreement, took a receipt of these rupees, and returned to Lhasa. The high-level functionaries bhāradāra of the Gorkhā Mahārāja also left Kerung, Kuti, Jhuṅgā and Phalāk125 that had fallen into their hands. The junior amban took the dharmapatra paper and returned with the army to Nepāla126 .
[4v]
The Gorkhā Mahārāja then (in the fall 1789) sent through this junior amban a petition arjī, customary, ceremonial or honorary gifts (najara) and presents (tohaphā) to the Chinese Emperor. [This mission] to Beijing (text:Pecin) City [was accompanied by] the vakilas Hari[hara Upādhyāya]-1127 , Balabhadra Khavāsa-1, and another twenty to twenty-five people. After the vakila and the junior amban reached Ḍigarcā, the army chief Cān Cun also dispatched one amban from his side and sent him along with the vakila from the Gorkhā Mahārāja to the audience of the Chinese Emperor.
After six months, this vakila [i.e., Harihara Upadhyaya] reached Beijing City, paid respect darśana to the Emperor, stayed in the city for forty-five days, and was granted fifteen audiences by the Emperor128 . After forty-five days, the vakila and the other people received from the Emperor ceremonial robes (khilata, text: khilla), who also granted the Gorkhā Mahārāja the credentials of a title (khitāpako paravānā)129 and many ceremonial robes. Then, the vakila, together with the amban and his own people, arrived in Nepāla after fourteen months130 .
[The Shamarpa conflict (1791)]
After three years, the high official (mutasaddi)131 named Cin Devuka from Lhasa came to Nepāla and said to the Gorkhā Mahārāja: “We cannot pay the compulsory payment of 50,000 rupees yearly. Please pardon us.” The Gorkhā Mahārāja replied: “I cannot recall the dharmapatra that was agreed upon by both sides. If you ask for forgiveness, first send the 100,000 rupees which are two years overdue. If you [afterwards] make a request, we will give you an answer.” This high official did agree to pay the overdue of two years. This official was friendly from outside but deceitful from inside.
[5r]
He said: “All these disturbances were caused by Samārpa Lāmā. Take him by any means to the border, arrest him there and bring him to Lhasa132 .”Having considered this, the high official Cin Devuka brought secretly the bhāradāras Dhurin Kājī (text: Dhurain Kājī), Aitu Kājī133 , sardāra Cyāgaṃlocan134 , Chasak Lāmā and so on together with troops from Lhasa to the border. This high official said to the Gorkhā Mahārāja: “Sāmarpā Lāmā and his bhāradāras should also be sent to the border. Then also kājī and other bhāradāras will come from Lhasa. They will sit together and make an arrangement to manage the affair.”
About one month before, Sāmarpā Lāma and the official Cin Devuka had gone to a place called Listi135 (near Sindhupalcok) in the territory of the Gorkhā Mahārāja. Due to God’s fate, the official died there. After his death, his younger brother came and stayed at that place. As asked by the [Chinese] official, the Gorkhā Mahārāja sent kaptān Bam Bahādura Śāha (text: Bam Sāha), Kājī Dāmodara Pãḍe136 , ṭaksāri Narsiṃ, sardāra Praval Rānā (text: Parval Rānā) and subbā Bhāratha to Kuti. From Lhasa, Dhurin Kājī, Aitu Kājī, sardāra Cyāgaṃlocan, Chasaka Lāmā, and other respected persons from Ḍigarcā [and] Sākya came to Kuti. After the bhāradāras from the Gorkhā Mahārāja together with the Sāmarpā Lāmā from Listi reached Chhusang137 (text: Chusāṃ) area, the bhāradāras from Lhasa said: “We have not been called here to manage the issue. These people have come here in order to deceitfully arrest Sāmarpā Lāmā.”
Having understood the intention, the bhāradāras from the Gorkhā Mahārāja kept Sāmarpā Lāmā with themselves and sent him, together with soldiers, two subedāras and one subā to Kuti.
[5v]
After the subedāras reached that place, they encircled the bhārādāras, along with Dhurina Kājī, saying: “You did not come to make arrangements for managing the affair; [instead] you were determined to arrest Sāmarpā Lāmā.” They arrested Dhurin Kājī, Aitu Kājī, sardāra Cyāgaṃlocan (text: cyāmalocan) and Chasaka Lāmā (text: chāsaklāmā) and sent them (as hostages), along with soldiers and the Sāmarpā Lāmā, to Nepāla.
[The battle begins again (1792)]
(On September 17, 1791) the Gorkhā Mahārāja’s bhārādāras marched together with the army138 towards Ḍigarcā and started to fight with the army of the other side and thus reached Ḍigarcā.
Fifteen days ago, the army of the Gorkhā Mahārāja had not yet reached [Ḍigarcā]. Chāṃju Lāmā, Ṭesu Lāmā and some Chinese individuals who lived in Ḍigarcā began their journey from there to Lhasa. For the protection of the monastery, [where] about 3.000 neophytes [lived] along with the lāmās, it was written in the dharmapatra: “Within 3 years, only in the first year 50.000 rupees were received from Lhasa, while the rest of 100.000 rupees were not paid. As per the dharmapatra, the work was not done, and therefore, the lāmās were responsible for 500 dhārni of gold.” When it was explained to the head lāmās from the Ḍigarcā magistrate that they should also arrange 100.000 rupees due for two years, they went from Ḍigarcā to Lhasa. The neophytes said to the bhārādāras of the Gorkhā Mahārāja: “To the best of our ability, we cannot give the gold [you demand from us]; nor can we pay the money. The monastery is [our] present, make it please you.“ Having said this, the bhārādāras of the Gorkhā Mahārāja made a halt at Ḍigarcā for 15 days, forcefully taking cash, property, and goods whatever they found before marching away from there (i.e., the Ḍigarcā Monastery).
[6r]
As they traveled, they engaged in battles and defeated the opposing army along the way. When the army of the Gorkhā Mahārāja reached Khartal139 in Langur Himal, it is alleged that 2,000 soldiers died due to smallpox and insufficient food supplies. The surviving soldiers of the Gorkhā Mahārāja, along with the bhāradāras, stayed there for seven months before finally arriving in Nepāla.
Afterwards, in the month of Maṅgsira of the year [Vikrama] Saṃvat 1848, army chief Cān Cun arrived in Lhasa, [sent] by his Majesty the Chinese Emperor. Cān Cun wrote a letter to [the Gorkhā Mahārāja], saying: “During your management of the affairs you arrested Lhasa’s bhārādāras, the Dhurin Kājī and others, and plundered valuables from Ḍigarcā.” He sent [this letter] through ambanPān Cūyā140 to the Gorkhā Mahārāja in Nepāla. In response, the Gorkhā Mahārāja wrote: “Respected persons from two sides had met in Kerung and willingly signed the dharmapatra according to which 50,000 rupees from Lhasa were given. Since the remaining 100,000 rupees were left unpaid, I had sent Sāmarpā Lāmā and my own bhārādāras to Kerung to arrange and enforce the payment of the rupees. [However] they did not pay attention to refunding the remaining rupees, and tried to deceitfully arrest Sāmarpā Lāmā and our bhāradāras. When our bhāradāras realised the deceitful intention of the Lhāsa people, they arrested Dhurin Kājī and other bhāradāras from Lhasa and brought them here. The amount of two years was due following the agreement of both sides and with the guarantee of Teṣu Lāmā and others. Therefore we had confiscated the valuables from Ḍigarcā. You are the big saradāra of the Chinese Emperor. Here is the dharmapatra that was signed by two sides. Decide carefully whether it is my mistake or the mistake of the Lhāsa people.”
[6v]
The Gorkhā Mahārāja sent this letter together with his people and exceptional tributes through the amban of Cān Cun to Lhāsa. However, the Cān Cun who is the commander of the (Chinese) troops did not take care of it, arrested the people of Gorkhā Mahārāja and wished to march for battle toward this side with amunitions and canons.
[The attack on Kuti and the retreat to Listi]
In Kuti, the police officer thānedāra from the Gorkhā Mahārāja’s side used to stay with a small army. The armies of both sides engaged in a war, and upon hearing about it, the Gorkhā Mahārāja sent another army for support. The area called Listi, which was known to be excellent, had been a station of the Gorkhā Mahārāja since early on. The army arrived there to provide assistance, and two stations [further] was Kuti. After the army's decision to proceed to Kuti, they were unable to do so due to a sudden snowfall. It seemed that as long as the snow continued, neither the Gorkhā army nor the Chinese army could advance. Once the snowfall had ended, army chief Cān Cun took about fifteen to sixteen thousand soldiers from the city of Cendung (text: Chengdu)141 in Sichuan province. When he reached near Khāsā142 , both sides prepared for war.
Previously, the Chinese army had attempted to attack Kuti several times, but without success. At that time time, they [attacked] with cannons and cannon balls, killing the subedāras and soldiers and claiming ownership of the Kuti fort. During the war, the Gorkhā Mahārāja's army was armed with caupālā and toḍedāra rifles143 .
[7r]
At this time, the arsenal was set on fire, and since gunpowder is the treasure of war, all the gunpowder, along with the soldiers of the Gorkhā Mahārāja, got burned. The war could not go on, and the Gorkhā Mahārāja's army retreated and returned to the Listi area. Having heard that Cān Cun happened to have the intention to come to this (i.e., the Nepalese) side, an army was sent from the Gorkhā Mahārāja for support. They positioned themselves towards the area called Listi and prepared for battle. After some days, Cān Cun arrived at Listi with his army and cannons. After both sides clashed into war, the Chinese army was defeated by the Gorkhā Mahārāja's army, which fought with the toḍedāra and caupavāla rifles. As the military leader of the cavalry, the amban, and soldiers of the Chinese army were killed, the Chinese army halted four kośas further. They could not intend to fight a war at Listi for a second time. The Gorkhā Mahārāja also thought it was not right to pursue them where the Chinese Emperor's army was going. While the Chinese army was [moving] towards Listi, they faced heavy trouble due to the hot season and lack of sufficient portions of food-grains. They were helpless as food was not available, and many Chinese soldiers died as the old portions of food-grains were not enough. Not even one of the monkeys living around Listi survived because the Chinese army killed and ate them all144 .
[7v]
[Fu-kang-an’s troops intervenes in the fighting]
[Then] the Gorkhā Mahārāja pondered, “Our fight is with the people of Lhasa, but not with the Chinese Emperor. There was an accusation in Lhasa regarding the big army chiefs sent by the Chinese Emperor who certainly had understood that both sides issued a dharmapatra as an agreement by correspondence.” Meanwhile the big vazir (text: ujīra) Ṭuṃṭhvāṅg145 , Bhīkak [and] sardāraCundūn Nājīmā, along with enormous troops146 and with and the banner of the Chinese Emperor, came to Lhasa and wrote in a letter sent to the Gorkha Mahārāja: “You arrested the bhāradāras along with Dhurin Kājī and looted commodities in Ḍigarcā. When the complaint of your big crime reached the Chinese Emperor, he sent me, the great Ṭuṃṭhvāṅg, with a big army to kill and destroy you root and branch so that even the name of Nepāla would not remain. Thus, I have come here. You have no idea of the sovereign power of China. However, a dishonest person [Sāmarpā Lāmā] from Bhoṭ (Tibet) approached you and is about to cause all this trouble. If you imprison him and send to me the noblemen of Lhasa together with Dhurin Kājī, who were arrested by you, accompanied by one of your senior kājīs, I will excuse your big offences. Then I will also give you gold weighing as much as this troublesome Lāmā.”
In response, the Gorkhā Mahārāja wrote a letter to Minister Ṭuṃṭhvāṅg, stating: “We will release the noblemen, including Dhurin Kājī, who were arrested [by us] and give up your territories that we seized. It is [however] not the dharma for a king to arrest and send back Samārpa Lāmā who came to us to seek refuge.”
[8r]
Upon receiving this [letter], Minister Ṭuṃṭhvāṅg wrote in clear terms to the Gorkhā Mahārāja: “If you arrest and send Samārpa Lāmā, our mutual friendship will continue. Otherwise, it will definitely come to an end. Do not write to me anymore from now on!”
[The battle for Kukuraghāṭa and Kerung, retreat to Rasuvā]
The following day, Minister Ṭuṃṭhvāṅg and his troops marched to the fort of Kukuraghāṭa147 via Jhuṅgā, where they had a dispute with the local police officer thānedāra of the Gorkhā Mahārāja and laid siege to the fort. [In July, 1792]148 he proceeded to Kerung. In Kerung, too, a thānedāra of the Gorkhā Mahārāja and his troops were on high alert within the fort.
Śatrubhañjana Malla (text: Satrubhanjana Malla)149 with his troops also travelled from Kerung to Kukuraghāṭa to provide support. [However] on their way at a location called Pāṅgusi150 , the troops from both sides engaged in a heavy fight. As the Chinese troops was larger than the Gorkhā Mahārāja’s troops, two subedāras and up to two hundred soldiers [from the latter’s side] were killed.
Satrubhanjan Malla killed the saradāras of the Chinese army and two to four ambans using his sword, but also sustained with two to four wounds himself. He then left [the location], reached Kerung, and joined subbāPhuvāra who was stationed at the fort there. The Chinese troops surrounded the Kerung fort and a large-scale battle between both sides ensued for six to seven days. Despite this, the head of the Gorkhā Mahāraja’s fort did not surrender.
[8v]
In the middle of the night, the Chinese troops set fire to the ammunition dump, and the entire ammunition, including gunpowder, burnt down. As the Gorkhā Mahārāja’s troops was smaller and the one of Chinese was enormous, the latter could surround the fort from three directions. Despite this, the thānedāra of the Gorkhā Mahārāja and his small remaining soldiers came out of the fort and fought back. Both sides suffered casualities. Eventually, the remaining subbā, saradāra and soldiers of the Gorkhā Mahārāja fled from the fort and arrived at a location called Rasuvā151 , which was previously under the control of the Gorkhā Mahārāja.
On the following day, the Chinese troops pursued them and caught up with them at a bridge crossing the Betrāvatī river at Rasuvā, where a three-day battle ensued. When the Chinese troops were unable to defeat them, they constructed a new provisional bridge and launched a surprise attack on the army of the Gorkhā Mahārāja. The saradāra and subbās of the Gorkhā Mahārāja were unable to resist and fled from Rasuvā. The Chinese troops then proceeded to Ṭimure152 .
[Retreat to Syāphru, Dhunche, Deurālī and Ramche]
After receiving news of an upcoming major battle at the fort of Kerung Killā, the troops sent for support by the Gorkhā Mahārāja arrived at a place called Syāphru153 . The Chinese troops also left Ṭimure and both troops confronted each other at Syāphru. The battle using canons and rifles continued for three days and nights. Since the Chinese army was unable to advance through the main route, they took an alternative route near the snowy mountains and suddenly arrived in front of the troops of the Gorkhā Mahārāja’s troops, who were unable to withstand this attack and [were forced] to flee.
[9r]
[Meanwhile] the troops sent earlier by the Gorkhā Mahārāja for support, consisting of kājī Dāmodara Pā̃ḍe, saradāra Paravala Rānā154 , and saradāra Bhā…155 , had reached Dhunche (text: Dhuṃce) and positioned themselves there. The Chinese troops arrived there too, and a fight ensued with canons, rifles, swords, and arrows for three days and nights. The Gorkhā Mahārāja’s troops continued fighting, but could not defeat the Chinese. The troops of the Gorkhā Mahārāj including subedāra Jagaval, subedāra Bhāskara Ḍhaleta and soldiers had aleready positioned for battle near Syāphru in a place called Deurālī156 on a hill. The Chinese troops arrived there as well and encircled the place from all four direcions. However, the subedāra and others from the Gorkhā Mahārāja attacked the Chinese forces from three directions. Then the Chinese troops consting of 10-12,000 soldiers157 came from the fourth side, killed both subedāras and soldiers of the Gorkhā Mahārāja and seized the place. On the Chinese side, one amban was killed. The place Deurālī is on the top of the hill. When the Chinese troops staioned there, the troops of the Gorkhā Mahārāja stationed in Dhunche below the hill. Since the troops of Gorkhā Mahārāja was in the lowland, they realised that fighting there was not a great idea. Therefore they left Dhunche and stationed at Kabhre158 (text: Kābhryā).
[Retreat to Dhaibuṃ and return of hostages]
After this, the Gorkhā Mahārāja understood that the Chinese army is great in number and, therefore, dispersed a large army consisting of cautariyāKābhryā Kṛṣṇa Sāha, kājī Bom Sāha, kājīAbhimāna Siṃ, kājīDhokal Siṃ, saradāraSatru Sāla, and [other] subedāras with war ammunition such as canons, arrows, bows, etc. They all the reached a place called Dhaibuṃ.
[9v]
Afterwards, Chinese troops arrived in Kabhre, and both sides confronted each other, but in the end, the Chinese troops fled from there and stationed themselves at a place called Rāmacyā159 that lies between Dhunche and Kabhre. Several Chinese soldiers fell down from the hill and died.
On that occasion, the Gorkhā Mahārāja returned the previously captured Chinese soldiers along with a messenger who carried a letter written to Ṭuṃṭhvāṅg. Once the letter reached the commander of the Chinese army, he inquired about the well-being of the Gorkhā Mahārāja and made the following request: “Rāmacyā is a very small palace, and it is not suitable to the army to be stationed there. Dhaibuṃ is a much larger place. Therefore, out of friendship, make an arrangement to let my troops reach the other side of Betrāvatī river and be stationed there. Then, we, the head of the troops, ministers and saradāras will gather in Dhaibuṃ and make negotiations. Until the negotiations are completed, soldiers from both sides should not fire and the river shall not be crossed by them.” This was then message conveyed [in the letter] to the Gorkhā Mahārāja.
When the Gorkhā Mahārāja learned the details of saradāra Bhīkaṃ’s letter, he issued the following order to his noblemen: “Leave Dhaibuṃ with troops, cross the Betrāvatī river, and make fortifications along the main route160 in Lacābuk, Cugdi, Dudhyā hills, Tuinthalā161 , and Nuwakot.” The noblemen carried out the Gorkhā Mahārāja’s order. Then, saradāras and the head of the Chinese troops and his soldiers came to Dhaibuṃ/Kābhre with their war ammunition and huge canons and made fortifications there.
[10r]
On that occasion, the Gorkhā Mahārāja returned kājī Dhurin, Aitu, and three other Chinese soldiers, who were earlier captured, to the Chinese Minister. They were accompanied by the kājīsRaṃjit Pā̃ḍe, Bhoṭu Pāḍe, and the ṭaksārīNarasiṃ. These three noblemen of the Gorkhā Mahārāja reached there, where the Chinese Minister asked them whether the news of Sāmarpā’s death he heard was true or false. The kājīs and the ṭaksarī replied: “Your people, kājī Dhurin, etc., have seen it with their own eyes. Please ask them.” After three days, the Chinese Minister sent a letter to the Gorkhā Mahārāja, stating: “Nuwakot will be a suitable place for us, so empty it. I will come to Nuwakot with my troops to be stationed there. The venerable Mahārāja and venerable Sāheba (Kirkpatrick) should come to Nuwakot to meet me there. At that occasion, we will ensure [safety], make necessary arrangements, and I will leave Nuwakot and go to my own country with my big troops.” This much was written in the letter to the Gorkhā Mahārāja162 .
[The Minister] told kājīRaṃjita Pãḍe in another letter: “Please inquire about this matter within three days and return. If not, I will go to Nuwakot with my troops.” Kājī Raṃjita Pãḍe then reported all of this to the Gorkhā Mahārāja. The Gorkhā Mahārāja understood from the details of the Minister's letter that he [the Chinese Emperor] had no intention of making a treaty. As a result, the frontiers and houses were fortified even more. He then wrote a letter to Navāb Governor General Lord Aralkā Khanvansa {Earl Cornwallis, the head of the [British] army, seeking assistance assuming that the Company Government was a true friend, and sent it to Kolkatta.
[10v]
The Gorkhā Mahārāja also responded to the [Chinese] Minister's letter, stating: “If you agree to make friendship, you may be stationed at Dhaibuṃ. Nuvakot belongs to Nepal and you may not be stationed there.” The Minister became annoyed by this point in the letter of the Gorkhā Mahārāja and did not reply. Instead he started to construct a second bridge across the Betrāvatī River to reach Nuwakot with his troops.
[Confrontation and peace offer at Betrāvatī]
Upon hearing this news, the Gorkhā Mahārāja issued an royal order hukuma to his kājīs and bhāradāras: “Attack them and push them back! Do not cross the river where the Minister is positioned with the army of the Emperor.”
On the second day, the Minister himself emerged from his tent, took out his binoculars, and deployed the same amban and military troops that had defeated the Gorkhāli troops at Deurālī (text: Devarāli), along with two cannons, across the Betrāvatī bridge. The troops then crossed the river and divided into two groups. One group attacked the fort at Caphādī to take it over, while the other marched towards Dudhīya (text: Dudyā) mountain.
On the eighth day, after two praharas had passed, the sardāra and bharādāras of the Gorkhā Mahārāja's army had strengthened their position. Both armies clashed in the middle of the way, exchanging gunfire and later using swords.
[11r]
The Gorkhā Mahārāja's troops had the advantage of higher ground, whereas the Chinese troops were on a lower ground. Therefore they were able to withstand the fight and force the Chinese troops to flee. Several Chinese soldiers were killed, while only a few of the Gorkhā Mahārāja's soldiers lost their lives. Some Chinese troops panicked, fell down from the mountain and died, while others jumped into the Betrāvatī river and drowned.
After realising that his troops had been defeated and had fled, the Minister watched them through his binoculars and issued the following order: “Establish a strong checkpoint at the Betrāvatī bridge and do not allow any fleeing soldier who cross the Betrāvatī river to pass. Chop off the nose of anyone who tries to cross, and also send additional troops.” The Minister himself came to this side of the bridge with thirteen cannons. At that time, the Gorkhā Mahārāja's troops at the checkpoint pushed back the Chinese troops to Betrāvatī. Since the Chinese troops were in a hurry, they were unable to complete building a new bridge. In their rush to cross the bridge, many Chinese soldiers drowned in the Betrāvatī. The remaining soldiers threw two cannons into the river out of fear of the Gorkhā Mahārāja's troops, and many of them jumped into the river and died. When the Minister witnessed the defeat of his troops, he opened the way over the old bridge. One of his sardāraamban broke his leg while fleeing, and the remaining soldiers carried him on their back and joined the Minister's troops. However, he died three days later. The battle between the Gorkhā Mahārāja's troops and the Chinese troops guarding the old bridge was fought using guns. There was a small hill near the bridge, and the Chinese Minister took the cannon unit to this hill and fired at the Gorkhā Mahārāja's troops.
[11v]
As the Chinese army could not construct a defense out of wood and stone, they made a wall using the dead bodies of their own [troops] who had died painfully on the spot. The fight continued until dark, and both sides returned to their camps. The Minister also went back to his sleeping tent.On the following day, the Minister summoned Bhoṭu Pāḍe and ṭaksāri Narasiṃ and spoke to them, saying: “When both our troops engange in battle, sometime we win, and sometimes we are defeated. In such a situation no one should feel discouraged. Previously, I had sent an order to the Gorkhā Mahārāja stating that we would settle the matter upon arriving in Nuvakot. I had also ordered my own troops to stay at this side of the bridge. Despite this, we suffered losses (lit. ‘my troops died’). Let us consider this a [tragic] play, which I myself watched. The people and the poor population must now feel extremely terrified. The Gorkhā Mahārāja and the British Resident163 need not worry about abandoning Nuvakot as I have decided to abandon my intention of marching to Nuvakot. [Therefore] it is not necessary for the venerable Mahārāja and venerable saheba [i.e. the British resident] to come to Nuvakot. Now I will write a few points to the venerable Mahārāja to please him. You, too, write to him to accept to what I will write. If we can agree on the terms, I will withdraw with my troops from this realm to my own realm, report to the Chinese Emperor, persuade him, and arrange for many gifts khillat to be sent to the venerable Gorkhā Mahārāja and the venerable saheba.”
[12r]
Having spoken to [Bhoṭu] Pāḍe and taksāri [Narsiṃ], he [the Minister] said the following: “If Sāmarpā were alive I would have taken him. If he has died by the Allmighty’s will, send his remains, valuables, servants and the following items seized from the Gorkhā Mahārāja [to the Emperor] in order to show that I successfully recovered: valuables seized and brought from Ḍigarcā, along with some bolts of Chinese silk, and golden vessels that were looted from Ḍigarcā including the best presents granted by the Chinese Emperor to Tasilemuṃ Lāmā of Ḍigarcā. Also send the dharmapatra that was signed in Kerung because of the fraud by Sāmarpā. We will also return the document from Lhasa and tear up both documents. Then there will be no hostility between our two sides. You should write an arji to the Chinese Emperor and send an exceptional tribute (tohaphā) along with one of the four kājīs. As soon as the kājī arrives with the listed commodities and the arji, I will withdraw with my troops from this region and return to my own realm. If, however, you do not comply with my proposal, I will not withdraw with my troops, but instead I will definitely march into Nepāla. In this matter, it would be very prudent if the venerable Mahārāja and the venerable sāheba sit down with their kājīs and negotiate a treaty with the Chinese Emperor. Act in accordance with my instructions and send the aforementioned letters as soon as possible. If it happens that you think it is wise to engage in a battle, also reply quickly. I will then make preparations prepare for war.” This letter was sent by the Chinese Minister to the Gorkhā Mahārāja.
[12v]
After reading the particulars of the letter, the Gorkhā Mahārāja consulted with his kājīs and bhāradāras. At that occasion, the Chinese troops accompanying the Minister were afflicted with a fever, which caused many of them to die. The lack of sufficient food supplies aggravated the situation, as the Chinese troops could not store food for a long time. In this way the Chinese troops suffered in many ways. The Chinese Minister repeatedly reminded the Gorkhā Mahārāja to send a reply to his letter.
In the meantime, a letter arrived from the Lāṭha Sāheba (i.e., Governor General) in Calcutta in reply to the Gorkhā Mahārāja's letter, stating the following: “You should do whatever is good to maintain friendship with the Chinese Emperor, this will make things better. In order to strengthen the friendship between both sides, I will dispatch Captain Valiyam Kirikpātarik (William Kirkpatrick) Sāheba Bahādura.” After considering what the Minister and the Lāṭha Sahāba had written, the Gorkhā Mahārāja concluded that it would be best to show respect to the Chinese Emperor and worst to be at enmity with him.
[13r]
After making necessary arrangements, the Gorkhā Mahārāja sent kājīDevadatta Thāpā, subbāPratiman Rānā and Jit Sāhi, muttasadiBalabhadra and fifty persons together with an arji and the following items to the [Forbidden] City of China (i.e., Beijing): the bones of Sāmarpā Lāmā, his servants, his commodities and valuables; and some silver and bolts of Chinese silk presented to Ṭasilemuṃ Lāmā of Ḍigarcā by the Chinese Emperor and then seized [by the Gorkhā Mahārāja], and extraordinary gifts meant for the Chinese Emperor164 .
[The arrangement of Betrāvatī]
The Kājī and the commodities travelled with the Minister, while the Gorkhā Mahārāja also sent [many] hospitality gifts to the Minister. After negotiations, both parties agreed on the following terms165 :
• after five years a vakila of the Gorkhā Mahārāja, will go with an arji and tributes (saugāt) to the Chinese Emperor, pay darśana and report back with the tidings.
• The Gorkhā Mahārāja and the king of Lhasa (i.e., the Dalai Lama) would maintain their friendship and not fight again, and both parties would keep their own territories as before.
• It was [further] decided that, in transactions in Bhoṭ, the unalloyed mahindramallī of the Gorkhā Mahārāja would be accepted as unalloyed coins, and the adultered coins would be given the value of adultered coins.
• If any enemy attempted to attack the troops of the Gorkhā Mahārāja, this should be reported to the Chinese Emperor so that he could send an army and amunition for help.
Both parties agreed to this agreement.
The Minister, along with his troops and the kājī and others of the Gorkhā Mahārāja, left Dhaibuṃ and returned to his realm. Then the aforementioned bhāradāras, ṭaksārī and pãḍe of the Gorkhā Mahārāja accompanied the Minister on a four-day walk to Kerung.
[13v]
There, the Minister wrote a letter to the Gorkhā Mahārāja, handed over extraordinary gifts [meant for the Gorkhā Mahārāja] to the bhāradāras, and awarded them with medals. He also took care of the injured soldiers and allowed them to return [to his country].
Following the Minister's orders, the bhāradāras stationed in Kerung for twenty-two days, sent the injured Chinese soldiers and other commodities, such as tents, to the north (i.e., China), and then they themselves headed towards Nepāla from Kerung. After that, Bhoṭo Pãḍe and ṭakasārī Narsiṃ presented the letter and the gifts given by the Minister to the Gorkhā Mahārāja, and they also conveyed to him all the details proposed by the Minister.
Cān Cun, head of the troops, stationed in Listi, wrote a letter to the Gorkhā Mahārāja out of great affection as he had previously done. In reply, the Gorkhā Mahārāja sent [materials] for a feast and gifts to Cān Cun. After receiving the letter and gifts, Cān Cun became very happy and sent a letter and gifts back to the Gorkhā Mahārāja.
On the 2nd day of the bright fortnight of Kārttika, he (Cān Cun and his troops) left the place called Listi and returned to his own realm. In the meantime, the Minister had reached the plateau of Ṭingri passing Kerung and Jhuṃgā. Then Can Cūn, the head of the troops, left this site and met the earlier group at Ṭingri (text Ṭigari) and left for the other side (i.e., China).
[Subjugation of Tibet]
Once the Minister and the head166 of the troops reached Lhasa, they left there the three lāmās of Ḍigarcā, Sāṃkhyā and Lhasa. Then, they arrested the noblemen of Bhoṭ and their companions, the staff etc. and Dhyāmju Kājī and Dhuren Kājī, the two brothers of the (Dalai) Lama of Lhasa, together with Ṭāvā Kājī.
[14r]
They got angry with the previous ṭhānedāra and amban of Lhasa and fettered them all stating: “It was reasonable that you had to fight when the Gorkhā Mahārāja’s troops came to Ḍigarcā. You persuaded Teṣu Lāmā, caused him to flee from Ḍigarcā and brought him to Lhasa.” In place of these two ambans, they placed other two ambans and about five hundred soldiers as thānedāra in Lhasa. Having done so they departed from Lhasa to the other side in the month of Phālguna.Due to the hot season and strong winds blowing across Lhasa and the surrounding areas, many Chinese soldiers of Cān Cūn were injured in the territories of Gorkhā Mahārāja, [including] Syāphru, Dhaibuṃ, and Ṭimure, and died at Nyārūm. Forced labourers (begāri) from the Bhoṭ realm were brought in to bury the corpses. Since they could not find enough wood [in the forests] to burn the corpses they took it from the houses. Many people in Bhoṭ also died from smallpox, leading to the destruction of the Bhoṭ realm. As a result, the two-way trading route was closed.
While the kājī of the King (i.e., the Gorkhā Mahārāja) and the (Dalai) Lama of Bhoṭ previously held some political authority, they (the Tibetans) are now considered subjects/cultivators (raiyata) of China. In Bhoṭ, Chinese order is followed for any task. These notes were written as events occurred.
The document that is also known as the “Gorkha Memorial167 ” describes the events and circumstances of the wars between Tibet, China and Nepal that occurred from 1788 until 1792.
It begins with a dispute between Nepal and Tibet/China over border and trade issues, particularly Nepal's monopoly on minting silver coins for Tibet. The debasing of these coins by the Malla kings, resulting in less and less silver content and “a decrease of nearly one half of their value168 ,” caused Tibet to react, leading to unfavorable trade conditions for both countries. In response, King Pṛthvīnārāyaṇa Śāha minted coins with the proper alloy but refused to buy back all of the debased currency.
In 1788, this conflict resulted in an attack on Tibet launched by the Gorkhali army and in the occupation of significant portions of Tibet’s southern territory. Tibet was subsequently forced to pay tributes to Nepal, including an annual sum of 50,000 Rupees. However, as Tibet failed to fulfill these conditions, Nepal, under the formal leadership of the infant King Raṇa Bahādura Śāha (r. 1775-1816) and his uncle Regent Bahādura Śāha (r. 1785-94), invaded Tibet once again in 1791. During this invasion, they captured Shigatse, looted the monastery of the Panchen Lama, and detained Kājī Dhurin and Kājī Aitu. This was all made possible after Shyāmarpā Lāmā, the brother of the late Panchen Lama in the Tashilhumpo monastery near Shigatse, sought refuge in Kathmandu and allegedly informed the Gorkha king about the monastery's great wealth169 .
This was the moment when Tibet appealed to the Emperor for support, as the Qing held a protective role over Tibet. The Emperor decided to drive out the Gorkhalis from Tibet and initiated a punitive170 expedition under the command of Fu-kang-an (also called Cān Cun) with an army of reportedly 70,000 or 125,000 soldiers into the heart of Nepal. This campaign is listed in the “Ten Great Campaigns” (Shiquan Wugong) of the Qing, which is believed to have been written by Qianlong171 .
Bahādura Śāha was extremely fearful of the Emperor's punitive expedition and issued an executive order rukkā granting land for the purpose of performing “two hundred thousand puraścaraṇas of the mahāsahasracaṇḍī172 ” at the time of the Chinese invasion, which ended in autumn 1792 in Nuvakot, a day's journey from Kathmandu. In a brutal battle that resulted in thousands of casualties on both sides, the Chinese troops were met with strong counterattacks. After six months of intense fighting, in September 1792, Nepal and China signed a contract, the Treaty of Betrāvatī. Colonel Kirkpatrick, Lord Cornwallis' emissary and mediator between the two parties, arrived too late to intervene.
The outcome of the war did not have a clear victor, although both sides claimed victory. For example, the Nepālikabhūpavaṃśāvalī (commonly known as the Wright Chronicle) 20.92 (p. 135) states: “[Raṇa Bahādura Śāha] killed the Chinese army. He thus caused the Chinese Emperor to praise him.” On the other hand, Wei Yuan writes: “Therefore, the rebels' [i.e., the Gorkhalis'] request for surrender was granted173 .” Similarly, the Emperor wrote in an inscription from 1792 engraved upon a stone slab below the Potala in Lhasa: “Now that the Gurkhas have submitted to me, the Imperial army has been withdrawn174 .”
The result of the Sino-Nepalese war can indeed “be best described as a stalemate. There was no real winner175 .” Nevertheless, Nepal successfully maintained its territorial integrity and sovereignty but lost its rights and coinage privileges in Tibet and had to acknowledge, albeit only in a formal sense, China's suzerainty, by sending quinquennial missions to Beijing176 . This acknowledgment was made through the practice of sending quinquennial missions to Beijing as agreed upon by King Bahādura Śāha and Emperor Qianlong at Betrāvatī near Nuvakot, most likely on October 2, 1792177 . In the following century, a total of eighteen missions were sent to China, with regular missions between 1792 and 1852, followed by only five missions afterwards178 .
The Treaty of Betrāvātī marked the conclusion of the war, but it resulted in significant losses for Nepal and had a detrimental impact on Nepal's economic well-being. Among the losses incurred, in addition to the loss of lives, was Nepal's suzerainty over Lhasa and other Tibetan regions that had been maintained since the Malla period. The economic crisis caused by this loss played a significant role in Nepal's defeat in the Anglo-Nepal war (1814-1816). In hindsight, it can be argued that Nepal might have been able to avoid a conflict with China had it pursued diplomatic negotiations instead.
What does the Sandhi contribute to a better understanding of the Sino-Nepalese war? First, it must be stated that the reliability of the document has been called into question by scholars such as Camman (1951: 111). Nevertheless, it should be noted that in many details, the document aligns with other sources, and its overall assessment appears to be fair. This primarily concerns the description of the military events that support the argument that Nepal did not lose the war despite its gradual retreats. On the contrary, it was China that failed to make significant progress, did not reach Kathmandu only to establish an amban as a symbol of suzerainty. It appears that all parties involved in the conflict learned valuable lessons: China realized the formidable barrier posed by the Himalayas, Tibet recognized its farreaching dependence on China, Nepal understood the need to halt its expansionist ambitions, and British India realized the futility of attempting to conquer Nepal. As a result, the document confirms the position that, despite setbacks and losses, Nepal managed to solidify its position between the superpowers of China and British India, while Tibet remained in an unresolved status without gaining independence.